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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
RAY J. ROBINSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, CASE 
vs. NO..__ __ _ 
KATHRYN B. ROBINSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT•s BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case in which the mother of two minor chil-
dren sought to have a decree of divorce, entered Nove~IV­
ber 30, 1959, and which awarded the custody of two minor 
children, then aged 3 years and 7 months, now aged 8 
years and 5 years, modified; the district court denied the 
petition for modification. Appellant seeks a reversal of 
the District Court judgment and custody of the minor 
children. 
STATEMENT OF FAGrS 
Appellant, Kathryn B. Robinson Wilkins, was the de-
fendant in a divorce action filed by her husband, the re-
spondent, on November 24, 1959 (R. 4). The plaintiff 
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prayed for and was awarded the custody of two children, 
Pamle Rae, a girl then of the age o!f 3 years, and V[cki 
Lynn, a ·girl of the age of 7 months. 
The appellant signed an appearance, consent and 
waiver in the proceedings and a default judgment of di-
vorce was taken against her. The complaint was filed 
and heard on the same date, the 24th day of Norvember. 
A decree o!f divorce was entered on the 30th day of No-
vember, _1959, awarding the custody of the children to their 
father, "with the provision that defendant shall have the 
right to visit with said two children and have them visit 
with her at any and all reasonable times and occasions, 
when not detrimental to their health and well-being." 
After the divorce respondent remained in Lehi for a 
period of approximatey two months and then he went to 
Spokane, Washington, taking the children with him, wheTe 
he lived with his sisteT (Tr. 23). He remained in Spokane 
until June of 1960 at which time he moved with his sister 
and children to Couer d'Alene, Idaho, where he worked 
in a garage. 
In October of 1960, one year after the divorce, re-
spondent married his present wife and the children lived in 
a home on Front Street in Couer d'Alene. They moved, 
after a period of about four months, to a home located at 
1316 Wallace Street, where they resided for approximately 
two years. After a period of two years respondent moved 
with his family to the town of Worley, Idaho, where he 
went into a service station business (Tr. 26). 
When the Robinsons moved to Worley they lived in 
one home for a period of approximately five months. Next 
they morved to the place of their residence at the time of 
the trial (Tr. 29). 
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At the time of the hearing the respondent had in his 
house one child of his present wife by a former marriage, 
the two children of appellant and respondent and two chil-
dren by his present marriage (Tr. 38 and 39). Accord-
ing to respondent, he has an income of approximately 
$400.00 per month, (Tr. 39) and must work approximately 
10 hours a day six days a week in order to maintain his 
business (Tr. 98). Respondent and his family live in a 
home, pictures of which are in evidence. 
Shortly after the children left Utah in 1960, their 
mother went to Idaho to visit them. She went to Spo-
kane in February of 1960 (Tr. 60). The record does not 
reflect the period of time which she visited with them at 
the time, but it does show (R. 24), "that the defendant has 
visited with her children for a period of only a few hours 
since the entry of the deccree, November 30, 1959." The 
court further found, at line 13 of R. 24, "that the defend-
ant has not been afforded reasonable rights of visitation 
with her children." 
On April 20, 1962, the defendant filed a motion to 
modify the decree of divorce with respect to the provisions 
for the custody of the children. The defendant's motion 
to modify the decree to grant her greater rights of visi-
tation with the children was first contested by a special 
appearance ( R. 18) . In this special appearance, the plain-
tiff contested the jurisdiction of the district court to modify 
the terms of the decree. This was done on the basis that 
the plaintiff was a resident of Idaho and that the Utah 
court was without jurisdiction to modify the terms of the 
divorce decree. The plaintiff's special appearance for the 
purpose of objecting to the court's jurisdiction was denied, 
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(R. 22) and defendant's petition was granted after a con-
test. 
The order modifying the court's decree, which com-
mences in the record at page 23, provided that the mother 
should have the right of visitation for a period m one month 
during the year 1962 (R. 26). It further specifically r~ 
served jurisdiction of the court to modify the decree in the 
future. It aslo provided that the ·mother should have the 
right of visitation with the children during the Christmas 
holidays of 1962. 
Plaintiff appeared and objected to the prorvision in the 
court's order awarding rights of visitation to the mother 
during the Christmas holidays of 1962, contending that 
those rights of visitation were not to commence until 1963 
(R. 27). 
Appellant went to Couer d'Alene, Idaho, during the 
Christmas holidays of 1962 and br.ought the children to 
Utah and flew them back to Idalho at a cost to her of ap-
proximately $300.00 (Tr. 68). While in Idaho returning 
the children, there was an altercation between the appel-
lant and the respondent which will be adverted to subse-
quently (Tr. 71). 
The children came to Utah during the summer of 1963 
and this action was instituted by the appellant. 
POINT I 
THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN APPELLANT'S 
CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE· THE ENTRY OF .THE DE-
CREE OF DIVORCE SUFFICIENT TO REQUIRE A 
CHANGE IN THE CUSTODY AWARD OF THE DE-
CREE. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
The fullest exposition of the law in Utah with respect 
to the right of the courts to modify a divorce decree, and 
the right of the party to have a decree modified is as set 
forth in Anderson vs. Anderson, 172 P. 2d, 132. The gen-
eral rules enunciated there are in agreement with the rules 
of most other jurisdictions. The most comprehensive treat-
ment of this general subject that the appellant has found 
is found in 43 A.L.R. 2d commencing at page 364. 
The most frequent justification in conjunction with 
other facts for the modification of an award of the custody 
of a child is the remarriage of the spouse who has been 
deprived of the custody. Ott v. Ott (1932) 127 Cal. App. 
322, 15 P. 2d 896; Kelly v. Kelly (1946) 75 Cal. App. 2d 
408, 171 P. 2d 95; Farrell v. Farrell (1921) 190 Iowa 919, 
181 NW 12; Vullon v. Landreneau (1946) 209 La. 1060, 26 
So. 29, 139; Sargent v. Sargent (1948) 320 Mich. 33, 30 
NW 2d 422. Other cases to the same effect are cited in 
43 A.L.R. 2d at page 371 and following. 
However, remarriage is not the only reason which will 
justify a modification. 
Other factors present in this which have influenced 
courts in modifying a decree are: the presence or absence 
of other children in the home; the actual care or custody 
of the child by one other than the parent; the fact of the 
remarriage furnishing a home as opposed to a previous 
condition, and the obstruction or difficulty of visitation. 
Appellant was 17 years of age when she married the 
respondent and she was 22 at the time of her divorce (Tr. 
62). 
At the time of the divorce of the parties, the defend-
ant had not completed high school (Tr. 62). She was un-
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employed (Tr. 59). Since the divorce of the parties, she 
has remarried, having married her present husband on 
Decemlber 27, 1960 (Tr. 59). She has gone to school at 
night school and finished the requirements for her high 
school diploma (Tr. 62-63). She completed a business 
school ·course in 1960 and then went to work in a respon-
sible position (Tr. 60). Appellant and her husband have 
lived in the same home since they were married (Tr. 76). 
Her present husband is a carpenter and in the year 1962 
he earned $6,000.00 while being off work for three months 
with a broken ankle (Tr. 64). 
As is pointed out by the case of Anderson v. Ander-
son, supra, the presumption that children of tender age 
are better off with their mother is not as strong follow-
ing the entry of the decree of divorce as it is prior to the 
entry of the decree. Nevertheless, the same reasons which 
motivated the legislature to enact Title 30-3-5 have va-
lidity in cases such as this. The reason for this fact is 
well stated in the case of Juri v. Juri, a California case, 160 
P. 2d page 73 which reads as follows at page 76: 
"'it is not open to question, and indeed it is universally 
recognized, that the mother is the natural custodian 
of her young. This view proceeds on the well known 
fact that there is no satisfactory substitute for a 
mother's love. So true is this that in this state the 
code exacts that she shall have custody of her child, 
everything else being equal, unless the child has 
reached the age which necessitates a particular edu-
cation or preparation for its life work. Civ. Code, Sec. 
138. In the case of girls it is obvious that they are 
particularly in need of the sympathy, affection, consid-
eration and tender care which only a mother can give 
-and so normally they should be in her custody.' And 
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in Estate of Lindner, 13 Cal. ·App. 208, 212, 109- P. 
101, 103, it was said that 'A mother who is both cap-
able and anxious to rear her own offspring should not 
be deprived of the opportunity to thus discharge ~the 
duty she owes to the child, without a clear showing of 
unfitness for the trust.'" 
There is nothing in the record, either in the· findings 
of fact, conclusions of law or the decree, as originally filed, 
(R. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13) which find that the mother, the 
appellant, was other than a fit and proper person. There 
is no finding made pursuant to the hearing in 1963 shown 
at page 55 and 56 of the record, which finds that the mother 
is not a fit and proper person to be awarded the custody 
of the children. 
The appellant does not claim that the father and his 
present wife are not fit custodians for the children. She: 
does claim that there has been a substantial change of cir-
cumstances since the entry of the decree in 1959 and the 
hearing of this petition in 1963. 
POINT II 
THE CHILDREN'S WELFARE. WOULD BE BEST 
SERVED BY BEING REARED BY THEIR MOTHER. 
INSTEAD OF THEIR STEP-MOTHER. 
Respondent worked . to provide for a family of five 
children and to do this he must work approximately ten 
hours a day, six days a week (Tr. 98). Of necessity this 
results in the children being reared by their step-mother. 
For the reasons pointed out in Juri v. Juri, supra, and those 
set forth in the case of Woof v. Woof, 169 P. 2d at 961, the 
children would be better off if they were in the home of 
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their mother. Obviously, the children would be better be-
ing reared by their mother in a home with one other child 
than by their 'Step-mother in a home with three other chil-
dren by two different marriages. See also Emerson v. Em-
erson, 188 P. 2d 252. 
That the environment would be better in the home of 
the mother is demonstrated throughout the record by the 
different standards by which the parties comport them-
selves. Repeatedly the record shows the rude, uncivil, un-
gracious and ill-mannered way of living on the part of the 
respondent and his wife that bode ill for the children if 
their custody is not awarded to appellant. 
On two or three occasions after trips from Lehi to 
Couer d'Alene or to Spokane for the purpose of visiting 
her children appellant has been treated rudely and dis-
courteously. Surely 900 ·miles and five years of time should 
enaJble all but the most ill-bred persons to breach past 
wrongs or imagined wrongs and be decent to the mother 
of one's own children. 
As was stated earlier, the children here in question 
are little girls and the opinion quoted in Juri v. Juri, supra, 
is, if anything, more cogent in the case of small girls than 
of young boys. 
Without any question, the circumstances of the mother 
were very materially different at the hearing in 1963 than 
they were at ~the time of the divorce. At the time of the 
divorce the appellant was unemployed and she had no way 
to earn a living other than that of working as a waitress 
( Tr. 59 and 60). She had no place to live, she went to live 
with a friend (Tr. 59). In 1963 the appellant had com-
pleted her high school education, she had completed a busi-
ness school course. 
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At the trial the witness Mona Christenson testified 
that the appellant is a good housekeeper and a good cook 
(Tr. 11). That the children were well cared for when they 
were with her (Tr. 12). She testified that when she and 
the appellant went to Idaho to obtain the children in 1963 
that they had been bathed but that they were not clean 
(Tr. 12). 
Respondent's husband is well emplo~ed and expressed 
his desire that the children come to his home to live. 
POINT ill 
TilE CHILDREN WOULD HAVE A MORE STABLE 
HOME ENVIRONMENT IF CUSTODY WERE 
CHANGED. 
The period of time that the children have resided with 
the respondent has been one in which they have moved 
frequently from town to town and within towns in which 
they have lived. When the respondent left Lehi some two 
months after the decree of divorce was entered, he went 
to Spokane, Washington, where he first worked as a jani-
tor and then for a motor car company (Tr. 23). Then 
in June of 1960, some seven months after the entry of the 
divorce decree, he moved with the children from Spokane 
to Couer d'Alene and went to work at a garage. He worked 
there approximately three years and then went to work 
for a veneer company. 
After the respondent moved from Spokane to Couer 
d'Alene, he lived with his sister until he was married and 
then moved into a home of his own. 
It should be noted that the respondent did not remem-
ber the date of his marriage to his present wife (Tr. 25). 
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Neither did he remember the birth dates of his daughters 
(Tr. 33). 
The respondent and his wife lived in two homes in 
Couer d'Alene in a three year period and they lived in two 
different homes during the period of time that they re-
sided in Worley (Tr. 29). 
Obviously it is not in the interest of the children to be 
moved from place to place and it is in their interest to re-
side in one locale where they can become acquainted with 
their neighbors and where they can acquire friends. 
POINT IV 
CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN BY THE 
COURT TO THE ATTITUDES OF THE PARENT WITH 
RESPECT TO RIGHTS OF VISITATION ON THE PART 
OF THE OTHER PARENT. 
Courts have expressed themselves to the effect that 
children should have the right to know both parents, and 
when one parent makes it difficult for the child to know 
the other parent, then that fact is a reason for the inter-
vention of the court in making an order affecting the cus-
tody of a child. See Ludlow v. Ludlow, 201 P. 2d 579 and 
Williamson v. Williamson, 206 P. 2d 605, an OTegon case. 
It appears without question that the respondent does 
not desire to have the mother of the children associate with 
them. This fact is demonstrated by the finding of the 
court in the hearing in 1962 that despite a trip from Lehi 
to Spokane to visit with her children, that she had only 
been permitted to visit them for but a few hours and that 
she had been denied a reasonable right of visitation as was 
awarded her in the decree of divorce. 
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When she instituted a proceeding to require the ap-
pellant to afford her reasonable opportunities to visit with 
the children, her application was resisted on the ground 
that the Utah court had no jurisdiction to consider the 
matter. This despite the fact that such contention could 
only be labeled frivolous. 
When, after having visited with her children only for 
one month out of two and one-half years, the court 
awarded to her the right to have the children for the 
Christmas following the summer of 1962, even that small 
concession was disputed by the respondent (R. 27). Re-
spondent does not accord his former wife and the mother 
of his children the common courtesies that one normally 
expects. When she visited her children in Spokane in 1960 
she was accorded only a few hours with them (R. 24). 
In December of 1962, the defendant had expended ,the 
sum of $300.00 to go to Idaho and obtain the children and 
to return the children to Idaho by airplane so that she 
could have a few days with them (Tr. 68). 
During the lay-over between planes, she was not in-
vited to the plaintiff's home nor was she given any offer 
of a place to stay, but rather the respondent's sister made 
her welcome (Tr. 69). 
Even after this large expenditure and after having been 
with her children for only a week and being just across a 
street from the children, they were not permitted to re-
main with her for more than just a few moments prior to 
her return to Utah. 
An altercation took place in the home of the respond-
ent's sister. The record shows that the fight took place 
in the rear of the home where the appellant was a guest. 
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The respondent entered the home of his sister, he and his 
wife went down a hall and through a room and into the 
bathroom there to confront the appellant and mother of 
the children and engage in an altercation in the presence 
of orne of the children (Tr. 38). 
The attitude of the appellant should be contrasted with 
that of the respondent. Without any hesitation she made 
the children available to him when he came to Utah dur-
ing the period of time that the children were awarded to 
her (Tr. 49). She invited him into her home as any nor-
mal person would. She encouraged the children to visit 
with their father's parents, all of this in great contrast to 
the treatment that she received at his hands. 
CONCLUSION 
From all of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the 
children would be better off with their mother and that 
minor children, particularly girls, should be reared by their 
mother as opposed to their step-mother, if the mother is 
a fit and proper person. In the instant case the mother 
is better able financially to support the children. She would 
furn.ish a more stable environment; she would rear the 
children to be more gracious and hospitable; she could be-
stow a mother's love upon them; and the change of cir-
cum~tances has been sufficient since the time of the entry 
of the decree to justify the court in making an award 
changing the custody of the children. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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